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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past ten years, electronic mail (e-mail) has significantly al-
tered how we communicate with each other in the industrialized
world.' Attracted by its relatively low cost, speed, and ease of use, in-
dividuals and businesses have turned to e-mail to replace or supple-
ment traditional communication tools such as the written letter or the
telephone.' As a result, legislatures and courts have been forced to ex-
amine whether existing legal structures are sufficiently flexible to re-
solve issues that are either not present in other communications tools
or present but to a different degree.'
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1. A Senate report for the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Pub.
L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. (Supp.
1999)), defines e-mail as "a form of communication by which private correspondence is transmit-
ted over public and private telephone lines. In its most common form, messages are typed into a
computer terminal, and then transmitted over telephone lines." S. REP. No. 99-541, at 8 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3562. This description, although capturing the essential
qualities of e-mail communication, is itself somewhat outdated in light of the technologies avail-
able in the year 2002. In addition to telephone lines, e-mail is now transmitted via cable and
wireless satellite systems.
2. See Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation:
Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327 (2000) ("E-mail and the Internet have begun to
replace the telephone as the way people conduct daily personal and business communications.");
Timothy Coughlan, Comment, Applying the U.S. Postal Service Statutes to E-Mail Transmis-
siors, 25 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 375 (1999) (noting that by 1998 the number of e-
mails transmitted far outnumbered the number of pieces of ordinary mail, so-called "snail mail,"
delivered by the United States Postal Service).
3. See Richard L. Marcus, Confronting The Future: Coping with Discovery of Electronic Ma-
terial, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 259 (2000) (noting the difficulty in separating ad-
vances in society that require changes to the existing legal structure, such as the introduction of
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Because e-mail rapidly became a means of transporting large
amounts of information, it was not surprising that privacy was one of
the first issues to be raised. The legal community was faced with dif-
ficult questions such as whether employers should be allowed to moni-
tor employee e-mails4 and how to deal with the possibility that e-mails
could be intercepted without authorization.' Other novel legal issues
are related to e-mail's unique characteristics. For example, mass mar-
keters were attracted to e-mail because they could transmit thousands
of unsolicited messages (or "spam") with very little effort and very lit-
tle cost. To counteract mass marketer's abuse of e-mail's efficiencies,
many states quickly enacted anti-spain laws that placed restrictions on
unsolicited e-mail messages.6
The e-mail revolution also had a profound effect in the area of
civil discovery. As e-mail use became more commonplace, litigators
quickly recognized the wealth of potential evidence that could be
found in an opponent's e-mail archives. Many litigators were also
pleased or shocked (depending on whether they were the requestor or
requestee) to learn that it was also possible to recover e-mail messages
that had apparently been discarded through the delete function found
in all e-mail programs. In fact, it quickly became apparent that it is
very difficult for a person to simply discard an unwanted or improper
e-mail message. As a result of this technical quirk, many millions of
new e-mail messages are created every day, and despite their author's
best efforts to delete them, it remains technically possible to locate and
produce these messages during pre-trial discovery.
The legal question of whether these "deleted"7 messages should
be produced is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The current Federal Rules apply the same criteria to the discovery of
e-mails that have been applied to paper-based discovery for decades.
the motorcar, from developments, such as the use of the horse for transportation, that do not re-
quire a drastic change in the existing legal rules).
4. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury, 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that em-
ployees harbor no reasonable expectation of privacy concerning their use of workplace computers
despite the employer's assurances that employee e-mails would remain privileged). But see Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act of 2000, Digital Privacy Act of 2000 and Notice of Electronic
Monitoring Act: Hearing on H.R. 5018, H.R. 4987 and H.R. 4908 Before the House Subcomm. on
the Const. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (documenting a failed attempt to
require that employers give notice to employees before monitoring their e-mail correspondence).
5. See 18 U.S.C §§ 2511, 2701 (2000) (making it a federal crime to intercept or disclose e-
mails during either transmission or storage).
6. See David E. Sorkin, Sparn Laws, available at http://www.spamlaws.com/state/index.
html (visited May 23, 2002) (listing anti-sparn laws from 22 different states).
7. Throughout this Comment, "deleted" e-mails refer to those e-mails where both the
sender and recipient have taken steps to destroy the correspondence. Technically, of course,
these e-mails are not deleted and may still be recovered.
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As a result, during the discovery phase of litigation, it has become in-
creasingly common for a party to request that the opposing party re-
cover and produce large numbers, often hundreds of thousands, of de-
leted e-mail messages through use of special "forensic" computer
techniques.
This Comment will argue that the current discovery rules allow
for the over-disclosure of deleted e-mail messages when considering
public policy concerns such as communications efficiency, individual
privacy, and free speech. However, before this argument can be made,
it is necessary to define what should be the proper scope of civil dis-
covery: how much production of information is too much? In a recent
article discussing modern discovery reform, Professor Jeffrey Stempel
offered a succinct and workable test for analyzing whether a suggested
restriction on the scope of discovery is justified.' According to Profes-
sor Stempel, any arguments for restricting or, for that matter, expand-
ing discovery should be made with reference to the central inquiry of
whether "disclosure and discovery [are] providing the information to
which litigants are rightfully entitled without requiring the production
of an unacceptable amount of information that is too extraneous, dis-
proportionately expensive to produce, private or privileged, or other-
wise deserving of protection on public policy grounds."9  Professor
Stempel's formula suggests that the appropriate level of discovery can
be found by balancing the litigants' right to access to information
against a number of other concerns including cost, privacy, and other
public policies.
In the case of deleted e-mails, this Comment will argue that the
discovery rules presently require disclosure of an unacceptable amount
of information. In particular, public policy concerns such as commu-
nication efficiency, individual privacy, and free speech should out-
weigh the rights of a litigant to access deleted e-mail correspondence
without some showing of particular relevance or need. Perhaps the
easiest way to expose the public policy issues involved in the produc-
tion of deleted e-mails is to analogize it to a more familiar context such
as discarded paper-based correspondence. As applied to deleted e-
mails, the current rules are the equivalent of requiring a litigant to first
dig through their garbage for huge amounts of shredded and discarded
paper correspondence and then expend considerable resources to re-
pair the letters and documents found. These documents are then
8. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of
Discovery "Reform", 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 221 (2001).
9. Id. at 221.
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handed over to a litigation opponent and may appear as evidence in a
civil case.
Although this analogy is useful to expose some of the potential
issues, to fully comprehend the nuances involved with discovery of de-
leted e-mails, it is first necessary to understand the unique nature of e-
mail. For this reason, Part II of this Comment will outline some of e-
mail's advantages over other communications media to help explain
the rapid rise in e-mail use. Part III will then explain, in layman's
terms, how e-mail actually works and discuss some of the reasons why
e-mail archives are often considered as likely to contain "smoking
gun""° messages-the kind of evidence that can drastically affect the
outcome of a case." But what is it about e-mail that can make it such
a potent evidentiary weapon? The answer lies in the combination of
three factors discussed in more detail later in this Comment. First, a
vast number of e-mails can be stored at a relatively low cost. Second,
contrary to popular belief, an e-mail is extremely difficult to delete and
often lingers in a later discoverable form. Finally, e-mail users tend to
adopt a casual tone, using e-mail more like the telephone than a letter.
Due to this unique combination of factors, it is likely that the
widespread discovery of e-mails is here to stay and will play an in-
creasingly important role in litigation. What remains uncertain is
whether the existing discovery rules are sufficiently flexible to incor-
porate such a significant change. To provide a background for an-
swering this question, Part IV will discuss the existing discovery rules,
the fundamental principles on which the rules are based, the existing
limitations on the permissible range of discovery, and the extent to
which the existing rules allow for extensive discovery of "deleted" e-
mails. After examining the existing framework, Part V will assess the
current rules' impact on e-mail usage, focusing on the fact that there is
10. "Smoking gun" is a term of art used by the litigation community to describe a docu-
ment that constitutes strong evidence in favor of the claim being made. For an illustration of a"smoking gun" e-mail, see generally Siemens Solar Indus. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 93 CIV.
1126, 1994 WL 86368 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1994). Siemens filed a lawsuit against Atlantic Rich-
field (ARCO) claiming, among other things, securities fraud. Id. at *1. Siemens alleged that it
had relied on representations that ARCO had developed commercially viable photovoltaic prod-
ucts that were of value to Siemens. Id. During discovery Siemens located an internal ARCO e-
mail, which included the statement: [A]s it appears that [the technology] is a pipe dream, let
Siemens have the pipe." Leslie Helm, The Digital Smoking Gun: Mismanaged E-Mail Poses Seri-
ous Risks, Experts Warn, L.A. TIMEs, June 16, 1994, at D1. This Los Angeles Times article of-
fers the following example of "smoking gun" e-mails used in litigation: "Dear David, Please de-
stroy the evidence," to which the recipient replied, "Acknowledging your request. Evidence
destroyed. Aloha, David." Id.
11. See Marnie H. Pulver, Note, Electronic Media Discovery: The Economic Benefit of Pay-
Per-View, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1379, 1380 (2000) (describing e-mail and other forms of elec-
tronic data as the "darling of discovery").
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already evidence to suggest that the current framework has had a chill-
ing effect on the type of information communicated.
In Part VI, this Comment will argue that the application of the
current rules has failed to take into account important public policy
considerations. The discussion will center on two policy concerns.
First, the current rules might have a profound, negative effect on the
efficiency of communication in our modern, wired world. Second, the
rules neglect the privacy concerns of individuals who are subject to
discovery of their deleted e-mails, causing negative effects on the indi-
viduals in deciding what information they should include in their e-
mail correspondence. Given these concerns, a question is raised as to
whether the mere fact that e-mails may be restored and recovered long
after their deletion should automatically require them to be accessible
in litigation. Perhaps technological ability should not necessarily set
the standards of the law. 2 This Comment will propose a solution in
Part VI--deleted e-mails should be presumptively undiscoverable
unless a requesting party can make a particular showing of relevance.
If, as this Comment will argue, the current discovery rules may
seriously inhibit the use of e-mail to communicate, it is important to
understand what may be lost. For this reason, it will be useful to
briefly analyze the general benefits that e-mail has to offer.
II. SOCIETAL BENEFITS OF E-MAIL
If e-mail is indeed, as it has been described, a revolutionary
communications tool, regulations having a detrimental effect on its use
should be carefully considered. Once an attempt has been made to
describe and quantify the general societal benefits of e-mail, the ques-
tion of whether the current rules of civil discovery have had, or are
likely to have, a chilling effect on its everyday use can then be exam-
ined. Using Professor Stempel's test for whether a restriction on dis-
covery is justified, the negative effects on communications efficiency,
privacy, and speech can be weighed against the primary reason for al-
lowing a requestor access to information: facilitation of the search for
the truth of the matter in dispute.' 3
12. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the
Electronic Frontier, THE HUMANIST, Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 15-16 ("New technologies should lead
us to look more closely at just what values the constitution seeks to preserve.").
13. Other commentators have utilized a similar initial analysis when discussing proposed
regulatory changes where privacy interests are at issue. For example, in the context of proposed
regulation of internet-based businesses using personal information, one commentator has rec-
ommended that "[tihe first step in analyzing the trade-offs involved in enacting new regulations
is identifying the benefits of new technologies or ways of doing business in order to weight them
in the balance with the benefits of privacy and the costs of regulation." Kent Walker, Where
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E-mail benefits may be divided into two separate, although re-
lated, categories: efficiency and social benefits. Efficiency benefits
concern the potential savings in time and resources that e-mail offers
compared to the other available methods of information transfer such
as the telephone and postal mail.14 Social benefits, on the other hand,
involve the ability to enhance the feeling of community in our society.
Obviously, the more efficient the communications method, the more
likely people are to use it, and the more effective it will be for building
and maintaining relationships.
A. Efficiency of E-Mail as a Means of Communication
E-mail is "arguably the most efficient means of communication
yet devised by humans, with the possible exception of gestures.""
Whether this statement is accurate or is a reflection of the hysteria
that is often associated with new technologies, it nevertheless raises an
intriguing question: What is it about e-mail that could inspire such a
strong claim?
Compared to traditional instruments of communication, e-mail
offers many significant advantages. An e-mail message may be
thought out, written, and sent in less than a minute. Once sent, it can
reach its destination, however distant, in a matter of seconds. Letters,
on the other hand, take considerably longer to write because they re-
quire a more formal structure and subsequently take days rather than
seconds to reach -their destination. Although the telephone has the
advantage of extremely fast transmission, it also requires that both
parties be available to communicate simultaneously, a significant bar-
rier to long distance conversations, where time differences can be sub-
stantial. E-mail is asynchronous, it requires only that one party be
available at a particular time for the communication to take place; ag-
gravating games of "phone tag" are avoided, and information moves
more efficiently.
E-mail also allows the user to send large caches of data to a large
number of recipients with little or no added time or effort. The sender
avoids the costs of copying, printing, and delivering a large number of
identical messages in hardcopy format. Moreover, e-mail not only
Everybody Knows Your Name: A Pragmatic Look at the Costs of Privacy and the Benefits of Infor-
mation Exchange, 2000 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 186 (2000).
14. See Janet Mann & Melanie Freely, LAN-Based E-mail Takes Off, DATAMATION, Nov.
15, 1990, at 105.
15. Amy M. Fulmer Stevenson, Comment, Making a Wrong Turn on the Information Su-
perhighway: Electronic Mail, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Inadvertent Disclosure, 26 CAP. U.
L. REV. 347, 349 (1997) (citing Martin E. Hellman, Implications of Encryption Policy on the Na-
tional Information Infrastructure, 11 NO. 2 COMPUTER L. WKLY. 28 (1994)).
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eases the transportation of information, but it also provides both par-
ties with a cheap and easy storage method.16 Furthermore, e-mail is
relatively cheap. Once the initial costs of the hardware are paid, the
per-communication cost of e-mail is virtually zero.17 In comparison,
sending a letter costs at least as much as a stamp, and the cost in-
creases with the size of the document. A telephone call may be free
locally but quite expensive over longer distances. Sending a message
by fax costs approximately one hundred times more than the equiva-
lent e-mail.
In theory, therefore, e-mail represents an extremely efficient and
inexpensive way to communicate. In practice, this potential is borne
out by statistics showing that e-mail use is increasing dramatically and
that U.S. businesses are quickly embracing e-mail for their day-to-day
operations. 18
B. E-Mail's Community-Building Role
E-mail may revolutionize communication in the same way that
the telephone did at the start of the twentieth century. In the early
1900s, the telephone was partly responsible for an expansion in the
scope of the possible communities because it broke down geographical
boundaries that had previously hindered effective communications.
After the telephone became more commonplace in households, rela-
tionships could be maintained over long distances with relative ease."
16. E-mail is different from telephone communication, where fallible human memory is the
only easily available recording method or written correspondence that requires someone to physi-
cally place a letter in a file. See Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1154 (2000);
Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. Civ. A. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439 (E.D. La.
Feb. 19, 2002) ("With electronic media.., the costs of storage are virtually nil.").
17. Looking to cut costs in light of a downturn in automobile sales, executives at General
Motors issued a directive to all employees that states that e-mail should be used instead of long
distance telephone calls whenever possible. Keith Naughton, Motown Slowdown, NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 27, 2000, at 60.
18. For example, at Microsoft Corporation, e-mail has replaced the telephone as the most
frequently used instrument of communication. See Steve Lohr, Antitrust Case Is Highlighting
Role of E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1998, at Cl; see also Betty Ann Olmstead, Electronic Me-
dia: Management and Litigation Issues When "Delete" Doesn't Mean Delete, 63 DEF. COUNS. J.
523, 525 (1996) ("It is the versatility and simplicity of e-mail and voicemail that account for their
phenomenal growth as a communication media of choice in the business world."); Timothy Q
Delaney, E-Mail Discovery: The Duties, Danger and Expense, 46 FED. LAW. 42, 43 (1999) ("In
the last few years, corporate America has wholeheartedly embraced e-mail. At many corpora-
tions, e-mail has become the preferred form of communication.").
19. For a more complete description of the effects of the invention of the telephone on soci-
ety, see generally IRWIN LEBOW, INFORMATION HIGHWAYS AND BYWAYS: FROM THE
TELEGRAPH TO THE 21ST CENTURY (1995); DAN LACY, FROM GRUNTS TO GIGABYTES:
COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIETY (1996).
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E-mail is a further advance in this revolution because it allows for
cheaper, faster, and easier communication.20
In our increasingly industrial, high density, and urbanized soci-
ety, communities tend to be more difficult to maintain, and individu-
als can feel increasingly isolated.2' In addition to facilitating online
communication, e-mail may also promote communication beyond the
Internet. What starts as e-mail messaging can spill over into offline
interaction such as visiting relatives in other cities or meeting old col-
lege friends.22 Although inherently difficult to quantify, e-mail bene-
fits society insofar as it allows for increased interaction among indi-
viduals. The extent to which the current discovery rules interfere with
these benefits should at least be considered in determining the proper
scope of discovery.
It would be premature, however, to discuss reform of the discov-
ery rules before describing e-mail discovery practice as it exists today.
E-mail discovery has been the focus of a great deal of attention be-
cause of e-mail's unique technological infrastructure and unusual hu-
man usage patterns.
III. E-MAIL AND ITS USE IN DISCOVERY PRACTICE
Increased use of e-mail for business and personal purposes has
resulted in a corresponding rise in the frequency of production re-
quests for e-mails in the discovery phase of litigation. 23 The rush to
delve into an adversary's e-mail archives has been further fueled by a
torrent of scholarly articles and newspaper stories expounding on the
potential bounty to be found.24 Perhaps, the most effective advertise-
ment for increased discovery of e-mails has come in the form of media
reports documenting the use of e-mail in an amazing diversity of high
20. See Charles Bermant, The E-Mail Phenomenon: It's Showing Signs of Growing Up and Is
Starting to Have (Gulp) Rules, SEATTLE TIMES, June 13, 1999, at C1 (describing e-mail as a
"further wrinkle" in the revolution that started with the telephone).
21. See Walker, supra note 13, 52 ("[T]he sense of community is in increasingly short
supply in contemporary society.") (citing ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART:
INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985); ROBERT D. PUTNAM,
BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000)).
22. See id. (giving the example of getting back in touch with an old school or college
friend).
23. The use of e-mail as evidence has become particularly common in employment dis-
crimination, sexual harassment, and anti trust cases. For a detailed account of the rise in use of
e-mail in litigation, see Samuel A. Thumma & Darrel S. Jackson, The History of Electronic Mail
in Litigation, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1999).
24. See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Corporate Delete Keys Busy as E-Mail Turns up in Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 1998, at C1; Doug Bedell, Erased and Found: Click on 'Delete' and Email Van-
ishes, But Don't Assume It's Gone for Good, NEWARK STAR LEDGER, July 19, 1999, at 61.
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profile cases such as the Iran-Contra affair,25 the bribery scandal sur-
rounding Salt Lake City's bid for the 2002 Winter Olympic games,26
the Microsoft antitrust case,27 the impeachment of President William
Clinton,28 and more recently the widespread reports of key e-mail cor-
respondence that are expected to play a major role in the inevitable
litigation arising out of the collapse of the Enron Corporation.29 In re-
cent years, a mini industry has sprung up to render technical assis-
tance to attorneys regarding electronic discovery.3" The leaders in this
relatively new field, sometimes referred to as computer forensics, are
also doing an effective job of increasing the profile of electronic dis-
31covery.
25. During the Iran-Contra investigation, Oliver North and John Poindexter communi-
cated via e-mail. Although they had deleted their e-mail messages, the messages were eventually
retrieved from a backup tape and used as evidence in the investigation. See Geanne Rosenberg,
Electronic Discovery Proves an Effective Legal Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1997, at D5.
26. See Pulver, supra note 11, at 1412 (discussing a newspaper article that described how
the ethics panel investigating alleged improprieties in the Salt Lake City's bid for the 2002 Win-
ter Olympics based its conclusions, in part, on an e-mail written by a high ranking U.S. Olympic
official stating that "[a] lot of promises were made to secure votes").
27. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The Microsoft case
was perhaps the most noteworthy example of high profile use of e-mail in litigation. Despite
Microsoft CEO Bill Gates' denials of discussions of a cooperative agreement between Microsoft
executives and Netscape officials, e-mail from one Microsoft executive summarized the meeting
with Netscape stating that Microsoft needs to "understand if you [Netscape] will adopt our plat-
form and build on top of it or if you are going to compete with us on the platform level." James
V. Grimaldi, The Gates Deposition: 684 Pages of Conflict, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 16, 1999, at Al.
28. In February 2000, a Washington Times article revealed that the White House had not
produced up to 100,000 e-mail messages sought through several subpoenas by investigators look-
ing into "Filegate," "Chinagate," the Monica Lewinsky affair, and other matters. See Legacy of
Lawlessness, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2000, at A20. These e-mails were allegedly inadvertently
misplaced. See George Lardner, Jr., E-Mail Probe Was Expected; White House Recovery Plan
Awaited Inquiries From Hill, WASH. POST, May 2, 2000, at A21. The White House was ex-
pected to produce the misplaced e-mails within six months. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Former
Counsel Takes Responsibility for Missing E-mails, N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERV., May 5, 2000. The
price tag on the White House's restoration of the missing e-mails from backup tapes is $3 mil-
lion. Id.
29. See Julia Brunts, For Litigators, Discovery Now Often Focusing on Data Files, DAILY
LAW BULLETIN, Jan. 18, 2002 (quoting an electronic litigation specialist, who stated on the like-
lihood that e-mail will play a role in future litigation, "What did [the Enron] CEO know and
when is not going to be in any document, but it is going to be in his e-mail, and somebody's go-
ing to find it.").
30. The following is a non-exclusive list of companies specializing in the area of electronic
discovery: Computer Forensics Inc., see information available at http://www.forensics.com/;
Computer Discovery Labs, Inc., see information available at http://www.
computerdiscoverylabs.com/; Data Discovery, Inc., see information available at http://www.
teleport.com/-peterc/; Rehman Technology Services, Inc., see information available at http://
www.surveil.com/index/html; and Applied Discovery, Inc., see information available at http://
www.applieddiscovery.com/default.htm.
31. One such specialist, Joan Feldman of Computer Forensics Inc., based in Seattle, Wash-
ington, has contributed a number of articles. See Joan E. Feldman & Rodger I. Kohn, The Essen-
tials of Computer Discovery, 564 PLI/PAT 51 (1999) [hereinafter Feldman & Kohn, Essentials];
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But media exposure alone cannot explain why e-mail is now so
widely accepted as a key component of effective discovery. A more
complete explanation requires an examination of how e-mail works
and how people are using it.
A. E-Mail's Technological Infrastructure
Although e-mail has become a very important component of the
contemporary communications landscape, it is not perfect. One im-
perfection-the fact that it is very difficult to successfully delete an e-
mail message-is at the root of the problem that this Comment ad-
dresses. Other characteristics, such as the ease with which large num-
bers of e-mails can be stored at very little cost, are potentially benefi-
cial but nevertheless magnify the deletion problem in the litigation
discovery context because they ensure that deleted e-mails remain
available for discovery for longer periods of time. Because e-mail's
technological infrastructure is at the root of both the communication
benefits previously discussed and the increased use of e-mail in dis-
covery to be described later, it is necessary to explain the basic techni-
cal elements that constitute e-mail.
The general public has become quite familiar with the look and
feel of the various software programs that serves as the public face of
e-mail. For many, however, this is the limit of their technical knowl-
edge. These e-mail programs vary in visual appearance and complex-
ity, but almost all allow the user to compose new messages and attach
other electronic files, sort incoming messages using a number of dif-
ferent criteria, store incoming messages in individual files, delete mes-
sages, reply to messages without having to input target address, and
search the mailbox using particular keywords.32 Whatever the func-
tions offered, the main role of these programs is to provide the user
with an easy-to-use interface with the technological infrastructure rep-
resenting the e-mail network.
The core concept of e-mail communication is that each mailbox
has a unique identifier. In the same way that a letter requires a par-
ticular address, an e-mail can only reach its intended destination if the
address is constructed correctly. In an attempt to make e-mail user-
friendly, e-mail pioneers decided to use a form of identifier that would
be familiar; thus, an e-mail address is similar to an address used for a
Joan Feldman & Rodger I. Kohn, Collecting Computer Based Evidence, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 26, 1998,
at S5; Joan E. Feldman, Electronic Risk Control: Effectively Managing Computer Files, 42 PRAC.
LAW. 41 (1996).
32. See LEE SPROULL & SARA KIELSER, CONNECTIONS: NEW WAYS OF WORKING IN
THE NETWORKED ORGANIZATION (1991).
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letter: an identifying name, followed by an "at" sign (@), followed by
the name of the network where the particular mailbox is located.
Once an e-mail has been composed and addressed correctly, it
can be sent to the desired recipient over two types of networks: a local
area network (or LAN as it is commonly referred) or a wide area net-
work (WAN). A local area network, as its name suggests, consists of a
single computer or group of computers that are directly connected,
usually in a single building or group of buildings.33 When a person
sends a message to another person within the group, the message is
copied and posted to the target mailbox. A wide area network, on the
other hand, involves the use of external networks, or the Internet. A
message is sent either over a single network of related computers or
between networks of related computer to the recipient computer.
A common computer language, or protocol,34 allows e-mail mes-
sages to easily pass through the "gateways" between different net-
works. A protocol converts the e-mail message into a common "lan-
guage" understood by all networks using that protocol. Typically, an
e-mail message will pass through a number of computers as it closes in
on the recipient computer before it is finally copied to the recipient
mailbox. During the early days of e-mail networks, users were often
restricted to communicating within a small network directly connected
to them, but as technology developed, it became more commonplace
for both local and wide-area systems to operate together, allowing ac-
cess to all parties with e-mail addresses, regardless of the type of sys-
tem on which they operate.35
B. The Role of E-Mail in Modem Discovery Practice
Recent commentary on the role of e-mail in modern discovery
practice suggests that a request for production of e-mails may repre-
sent either a gold mine or a minefield, depending on whether you are
the requestor or requestee.36 Almost uniformly, contemporary com-
mentators focus on three idiosyncratic characteristics of e-mail when
attempting to explain why e-mail archives are likely to contain valu-
33. A Local Area Network (LAN) is a computer network that spans a relatively small area.
Most LANs are confined to a single building or group of buildings. Id. at 68.
34. A protocol is a set of rules that defines a format by which devices may transfer data to
each other. TCP/IP, or Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, is the de facto stan-
dard used to connect local area networks to the Internet. Id at 233.
35. Id. at 50.
36. See generally James A. Snyder & Angela Morelock, Electronic Data Discovery: Litigation
Gold Mine or Nightmare?, 58 J. Mo. B. 18 (2002); James H.A. Pooley & David A. Shaw, Finding
out What's There: Technical and Legal Aspects of Discovery, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 57, 59
(1995) (noting that electronically stored evidence could be considered a "potential gold mine" or
"genuine mine field" depending on which party has control of the information).
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able evidence: (1) e-mail users generally produce a large quantity of
messages, thereby increasing the chance that one will contain evidence
regarding a matter in dispute; (2) the content of e-mail messages tends
to be less formal and more likely to contain sentiments unavailable
from other sources; and (3) an e-mail is extremely difficult to perma-
nently destroy.37
Millions of new e-mails are created everyday and the sheer vol-
ume of messages created tends to increase the likelihood that at least
some may be relevant to future legal claims or defenses. In one sense,
therefore, the importance of e-mail discovery is a product of simple
mathematics. For example, a company with one hundred employees
creating an average of fourteen e-mail messages per day will produce a
total of roughly 100,000 messages per week.3" When you consider
that larger companies may have a workforces numbering in the thou-
sands or hundreds of thousands, the numbers of messages produced
increases exponentially. One electronic discovery professional re-
cently calculated that a real-world company with a workforce of
100,000 was creating 22 million new e-mail messages per week - a fig-
ure that shocked the company's CEO.39 But the number of sent e-
mail messages represents only a part of the overall e-mails that may be
accessible during discovery. The average U.S. worker with an e-mail
account also receives roughly thirty messages per day.4" These incom-
ing messages are also potentially discoverable during discovery.
The large number of messages created might not be particularly
significant in the litigation context if the content of these messages was
essentially benign. There is reason to believe, however, that e-mail
messages tend to contain information that a user might not reveal in
other, more formal, modes of communication.
E-mail messages frequently contain the type of communication
most beloved of litigators-spontaneous, open, candid, and sometimes
even salacious.4 Based on the anecdotal evidence, the tone of e-mail
37. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 3, at 181; Thumma & Jackson, supra note 23, at 1-4.
38. An average of fourteen sent e-mail messages per day is probably a conservative figure.
There is evidence to suggest that the e-mail users may actually send considerable more. See,
e.g., Jon G. Auerbach, Getting the Message, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1997, at R22 (citing an esti-
mate that by 2005, the average user will send 29.4 e-mail messages per day).
39. John Jessen, Special Issues Involving Electronic Discovery, 9 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
425, 428 (2000).
40. Stephanie Armour, E-Mail Delivers Legal, Privacy Issues, USA TODAY, Nov. 12, 1998,
at 3B.
41. Essentially, this is the type of communication that might have earlier taken place in
whispers over cup of coffee or a meal. See Wendy J. Rose, The Revolution of Electronic Mail,
THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 21, 1997, at 7-14 ("Descriptions of e-mail communication
styles include freewheeling, candid, unfiltered, not modulated, raw and off the cuff.... [T]hese
very attributes, which lend themselves to easy, casual and seemingly efficient communications
[Vol. 25:895
"Deleted" E-Mail
correspondence appears to have evolved into a hybrid of oral and writ-
ten communications. Struggling to describe this unorthodox message
content, one writer stated that it is "like a phone call, only written. It's
like a paperless letter, but faster. It's like a casual conversation, or a
postcard, or a scribbled note to a classmate in the middle of class. It's
all of the above, and ... none of them."4 2 Perhaps, this casual style is
due to the lack of formal conventions and punctuation that tend to
subdue spontaneous expression when one composes a letter. Also, it is
possible that e-mail users may tend to be more open in their corre-
spondence because they are under the mistaken impression that they
can simply delete a message that might later seem to be inappropriate
or an inaccurate portrayal of their true thoughts.
Whatever the causes might be, the result is that e-mails tend to
contain information that is unlikely to be found in a letter or in other
documents. If the delete button on e-mail computer programs per-
formed the function its name suggests, it seems likely that many of
these candid, conversation-like e-mails would be quickly discarded by
both author and recipient and placed beyond the reach of even the
most technologically proficient discovery expert. Reality, however, is
not that simple.
Contrary to what most people believe, it is extremely difficult for
the average, technologically unsophisticated, e-mail user to render an
unwanted e-mail message unrecoverable. Encouraged by the common
meaning of the word "delete," e-mail users cannot be faulted for
thinking that a message is permanently destroyed when it is high-
lighted and the "delete" function is used.43 In reality, the delete func-
tion does not immediately make a message irretrievable. Instead, the
computer merely marks the message as available to be overwritten by
newer information. The length of time that passes before a message is
actually deleted from a hard drive depends almost entirely on two fac-
tors: the size of the storage space available on the computer (generally
the more space available, the longer a message will remain retrievable)
and the degree to which new data is inputted (the more new data in-
put, the quicker the message is likely to be overwritten). Thus, if a
computer has a large memory capacity and is used infrequently, a "de-
have stung many companies and individuals whose transmissions have returned to haunt
them.").
42. Jacques Leslie, Mail Bonding: E-Mail is Creating a New Oral Culture, WIRED, Mar.
1994, at 42.
43. See Andrew Johnson-Laird, Smoking Guns and Spinning Disks, COMPUTER LAW, Aug.
1994, at I (noting the general public belief that computers can delete unwanted files); William
Decoste, Sender Beware, The Discoverability and Admissibility of E-Mail, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. &
PRAC. 79, 81 (2000).
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leted" e-mail message may remain available for a significant period of
time.44 Of course, these lingering, not overwritten, e-mails would still
not be available for discovery if it were not for one final twist: modern
software programs can access and recover documents that have not
been completely overwritten. Because of its obstinate refusal to die,
this not-quite-deleted information is commonly referred to as
"shadow" or "ghost" data4" and, when properly authenticated, it may
be introduced as evidence in litigation.46
In the context of e-mail messages, therefore, delete does not
mean delete. Indeed, U.S. District Court Judge James Rosenbaum
has gone so far as to state that the inability to destroy electronic files
may be the computer's ultimate flaw because the "inability to forget
weakens and undermines the very ideas it permanently holds."47 In
the context of pre-trial discovery, this apparent weakness is exacer-
bated by the fact that this undeleted information may potentially be
stored in multiple locations.
In addition to potentially recoverable deleted messages not fully
overwritten, e-mails may be recovered from two other sources: (1) e-
mails that have not been deleted, or "active" data, may be recovered
from the hard drives of the computers where they are stored; and (2)
e-mails that have been deleted and overwritten may still be available
on backup tapes that are routinely used to avoid widespread loss of
data in the case of system failure or other emergency situations. 48
1. Active Data
In the simplest terms, active data is information that is currently
being used. In the case of e-mail, the active data will consist of all e-
mail in a user's inbox, any copies of sent e-mails that have not been
deleted (unless the user has indicated that sent e-mails should not be
saved), and any e-mails that have been saved to a file. Previously, e-
mail messages remained active until the user decided to delete them,
but more recently, often in reaction to the expanding use of e-mail in
44. See Johnson-Laird, supra note 43, at 8-9, 13.
45. See Matthew Goldstein, Electronic Mail, Computer Messages Present Knotty Issues of
Discovery, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 1 ("Like ghosts from the past... forgotten electronic blips
can come back to haunt a litigant, since computer data bases are subject to a civil discovery re-
quest.").
46. For a discussion of some of the obstacles to be overcome before an e-mail may be intro-
duced as evidence, see Decoste, supra note 43, at 85-89 (2000); Christine Sgarlata Chung &
David J. Byer, The Electronic Paper Trail: Evidentiary Obstacles to the Discovery and Admission of
Electronic Evidence, 4 B. U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 5, 35-42 (1998).
47. James M. Rosenbaum, In Defense of the Delete Key, 3 GREEN BAG 2d 393, 396 (2000),
available at http://www.greenbag.org/rosenbaum deletekey.pdf.
48. See Feldman & Kohn, Essentials, supra note 31, at 54.
[Vol. 25:895
"Deleted" E-Mail
litigation, companies have instigated procedures whereby all active e-
mail messages are automatically deleted at regular intervals.49 The
producing party can recover active e-mails simply by opening the files
and printing out the messages. However, as computer hardware tech-
nology advances, the number of locations in which active data is
stored is likely to increase. In the last ten years for example, it has be-
come increasingly common for active data to be stored on employee
laptop as well as desktop computers."
2. Backup Data
The vast majority of organizations utilizing computer technology
wisely take the precaution of copying electronic files and storing them
in a safe location as a form of disaster protection. 1 At regular inter-
vals, a "snapshot" is taken of the entire computer system; the data is
then transferred to portable media that are stored for a period of time
that can range from a few days to many years. 2 Any e-mails existing
on the system at the time of the snapshot will be stored and can be re-
trieved in future litigation for as long as the tape is kept.
By now it should be apparent that an e-mail user who wishes to
truly delete an e-mail needs either a lot of technical assistance or luck.
The situation that results is one where large numbers of candid e-
mails are created, are not completely deleted, and remain available
during discovery. With this in mind, it is not surprising that compe-
tent attorneys are likely to pursue e-mail discovery to the maximum
extent allowed by the rules of civil procedure and the court's interpre-
tations of those rules. 3
IV. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: DISCOVERY OF E-MAIL
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflect the basic philoso-
phy that free access to relevant information is necessary to determine
49. For most systems, a received message is automatically saved, usually to the inbox.
Unix systems, however, require a user to save a message, the default being deletion. See Ian C.
Ballon, How Companies Can Reduce the Costs and Risks of Associated with Electronic Discovery,
COMPUTER LAWYER, July 1998, at 10.
50. See, e.g., Superior Consultant Co. v. Bailey, No. 00-CV-73439, 2000 WL 1279161, at
*13 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2000) (ordering defendant corporation to produce a backup file of em-
ployee's laptop computer).
51. See, e.g., McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 32 (D.D.C. 2001) ("The purpose of hav-
ing a backup system and retaining the tapes was to permit recovery from disaster.").
52. Id.; see also Linnen v. A.H. Robbins Co. Inc., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *1
(Mass. Super. Ct. June 16, 1999) (defendants keeping backup tapes for three months before recy-
cling).
53. See Thumma & Jackson, supra note 23, at 33 (predicting that a rise in e-mail use in liti-
gation will be restrained only by the creative vision of attorneys and the receptiveness of the
courts).
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the truth.54 When originally enacted in 1938, the Rules introduced
the then-revolutionary concept of expansive discovery during the pre-
trial stage of litigation." Ten years later, the Supreme Court
wholeheartedly embraced the policy of full disclosure, agreeing that
"[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts is essential to proper liti-
gation." 6 By the late 1970's, however, there was a growing perception
that the discovery rules were being abused. These concerns went all
the way to the Supreme Court where Justice White, acknowledging
the growing disquiet, was moved to note that "there have been re-
peated expressions of concern about undue and uncontrolled discov-
ery, and voices from this Court have joined the chorus."5 " Thus, the
pendulum had begun to swing back towards restricting, rather than
expanding, discovery: a trend that would continue in the following
decades.
In 1983, the Rules were amended to introduce, among other
changes, the concept of proportionality. 8 For the first time, judges
were given the discretion to limit discovery when, in their opinion, the
burden or cost of complying with a request for discovery outweighed
the potential importance of the information in light of the importance
of the issues in the case and the parties' ability to absorb the costs of
production. This amendment clearly announced that there should be
limits to the amount of discovery allowed even if potentially relevant
information is thereby excluded. The trend continued in 1993, when
the Rules were again amended to set presumptive limits on the num-
ber of interrogatories and depositions allowed for each party.59 De-
spite this slight shift towards more limited discovery, the current rules
still reflect the original framer's philosophy of broad access to relevant
54. See, e.g., Tiedman v. American Pigment Corp. 253 F.2d 803, 808 (4th Cir. 1958)
("[D]iscovery is founded upon the policy that the search for the truth should be aided.").
55. See Stempel, supra note 8, at 202.
56. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
57. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 157 (1979).
58. The 1983 amendment added the following language to Rule 26(b)(1):
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in subdivision (a)
shall be limited by the court if it determines that (i) the discovery sought is unrea-
sonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery
has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information
sought; or (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account
the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources,
and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its
own initiative after reasonable notice of a motion under subdivision (c).
6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.07[1] (3d ed. 1997) (reprint-
ing 1983 amendment to Rule 26(b)(1), now Rule 26(b)(2)).
59. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2). These presumptive limits can be increased if the court is
satisfied that the added discovery would satisfy the proportionality test of Rule 26(b)(2).
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information. In the context of e-mail discovery, two rules generally
define the universe of information that may be requested: Rule 26 out-
lines the general rule of broad discovery and then gives certain excep-
tions to the general rule, including the proportionality principle, while
Rule 34 describes the types of documentary evidence that may be re-
quested.
A. Framework for Discovery of Documents: Rules 26 and 34
Rule 26, the core provision of the rules of discovery, clearly re-
flects a policy of allowing expansive disclosure. Adopting extremely
broad language, the rule states:
In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense
of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any
party .... It is not ground for objection that the information
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admis-
sible evidence.6°
In addition to the broad wording of Rule 26, the Supreme Court
has further emphasized the expansive nature of the universe of infor-
mation that can be discovered by stating that the courts should inter-
pret the rules "broadly and liberally" in order to promote the policy of
full disclosure.61 When considering the appropriate boundaries of dis-
covery, the courts have generally followed the Supreme Court's in-
struction and ensured that access to relevant information is as broad as
the rules can possibly allow.62 As noted above, however, the extent of
disclosure may also be limited by Rule 26(b)(2), which grants a judge
the discretion to limit full disclosure when the burden on the produc-
ing party would outweigh the benefits to the truth finding function of
the court.
Pursuant to the general scope of discovery outlined in Rule
26(b), Rule 34 defines the categories of documents or tangible evi-
dence that a party may request.6 3 Prior to 1970, Rule 34 made no
mention of electronically stored evidence. The modern era of elec-
tronic discovery was launched in 1970, when the Advisory Commit-
60. Id.
61. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 506.
62. See Cox v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 38 F.R.D. 396, 398 (D.S.C. 1965) ("[I]n
the search for the ultimate, TRUTH, the Federal Courts, blessed with the rules of discovery, are
not shackled with strict interpretations of relevancy.").
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(c).
2002]
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 25:895
64tee, reacting to the increasing use of computers, revised the descrip-
tion of a "document" in Rule 34 to include "data compilations from
which information can be obtained, [and] translated, if necessary, by
the respondent."6  To further clarify its intentions, the Advisory
Committee included a comment stating that "electronic data compila-
tions" were now to be included in the category of documents that were
subject to discovery under the rule.66 Subsequent judicial interpreta-
tion of the change has left no doubt as to whether electronic evidence
is now discoverable. By 1985, a judge could comfortably declare that
"it is black letter law that computerized data is discoverable if rele-
vant."67 Consequently, any relevant electronic documents, including
active or deleted e-mails, are discoverable unless a recognized limita-
tion applies.
B. Limitations on Discovery
Although the present discovery rules envision broad access to
relevant information, they also recognize that there should be limits to
how far discovery should reach. For example, privileged matters pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine
are expressly excluded from the scope of discovery.6" Additionally,
the 1983 amendments to the Rules introduced the flexible proportion-
ality limitation that allows judicial intervention when the "burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit."69
64. 8A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §
2218 (2d ed. 1994).
65. The accompanying note states:
The inclusive description of "documents" is revised to accord with changing technol-
ogy. It makes clear that Rule 34 applies to electronics data compilations from which
information can be obtained only with the use of detection devices, and that when the
data can as a practical matter be made usable by the discovering party only through
respondent's devices, respondent may be required to use his devices to translate the
data into usable form.
FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee's note (1970). In addition to allowing discovery of elec-
tronic materials, the rule requires that the party in possession of the electronic information coop-
erate with the requesting party to make the information readable. Some courts have interpreted
this to require the producing party to develop software programs to extract the electronic infor-
mation and to educate the receiving party in how to review the data. See Nat'l Union Elec. Corp.
v. Masushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
66. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee's note.
67. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94CIV. 2120 LMM AJP, 1995 WL 649934,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995); see also Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 462 (D. Utah
1985) ("It is now axiomatic that electronically stored information is discoverable under Rule 34
of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure if it otherwise meets the relevancy standard prescribed by
the rules.").
68. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("[P]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged."); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b), (d) (codifying the work-product doctrine originally).
69. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
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1. Privileges
Electronic data is subject to the same traditional privileges that
apply to paper-based discovery. The significance of a privilege is that
it allows a party to resist discovery of an otherwise discoverable docu-
ment. 7' The traditional justification for privileges focuses on the fact
that there are specific relationships, such as the husband-wife or law-
yer-client relationships, that society should protect. Privileges reflect
an implicit assumption that the benefit of protecting specific relation-
ships is greater than the potentially negative effects of such protection
on the truth-finding function of the judicial process.71
An alternative, although related, justification for privileges con-
centrates on actual communication and the effect that a privilege will
have on individual privacy.72 Thus, communications between the
lawyer and client, in which the client seeks legal advice, are protected
to allow for more open communication.73 For purposes of this Com-
ment, however, it is sufficient to note that the judicial system recog-
nizes that the negative external effects, be they to society at large or to
the individual, have been, and should be, taken into account in decid-
ing the outer limits of litigation discovery.74 Indeed, Rule 26(c) explic-
itly empowers judges to perform a similar balancing test.
2. Unduly Burdensome or Expensive: Proportionality Limitation
Under Rule 26(c)
Where a court finds that the burden or expense of production is
disproportionate to the value of the information to the particular case,
the amount at stake, the parties' resources, and the importance of the
70. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 831 (6th ed. 1991) ("That which releases one from the
performance of a duty or obligation, or exempts one from liability which he would otherwise be
required to perform, or sustain in common with all other persons."); FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1)
("[P]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged.").
71. See Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications: II. Modes of analysis: The
Theories Justifications of Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1472 (1985).
72. Id. at 1484.
73. 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2290, at 542 (McNaughton ed., rev. vol.
1961) (describing the attorney-client privilege as "the oldest of privileges for confidential com-
munications.").
74. An excellent example of the judicial limitation on discovery based on negative external
effects is the self-analysis privilege. The rationale behind this privilege is that an organization
that conducts an internal, critical analysis of its own conduct should not be required to produce
that analysis in later or related litigation unless the party seeking discovery can demonstrate sub-
stantial need, because discovery of such materials would have a chilling effect upon the com-
pany's motivation to self-analyze and improve its flaws and would therefore be against the pub-
lic's interest. See generally John Louis Kellogg, What's Good for the Goose ... Differential
Treatment of the Deliberative Process and Self-Critical Analysis Privileges, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 255 (1997); see also Flynn v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 91CIV. 0035 KMW, 1993
WL 362380, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1993).
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issues raised in the case, the court may limit production of certain
documents or shift the cost of production to the requesting party. 75
This proportionality principle is particularly relevant to the present
discussion because it is the most commonly invoked legal mechanism
to restrict the production of deleted e-mails.76
Production of "deleted" e-mails is generally more costly than
that of active data. Deleted e-mails may be recovered either from the
hard drive of a computer or from emergency backup tapes. But in ei-
ther case, the recovery process is relatively expensive. The process of
restoring deleted, but not overwritten, e-mails from a hard drive will
usually require the assistance of a computer specialist because special-
ized computer programs are required to locate and recover deleted e-
mails.77 On the other hand, if the deleted e-mails is to be recovered
from emergency backup tapes (so-called "ghost" data), the producing
party will typically have to engage in a costly multi-stage process. 78
First, the available backup tapes must be searched to identify the tapes
containing the mailbox files of the person whose e-mails are requested.
Then the producing party must catalog the available backup tapes to
locate those likely to contain responsive e-mails. This can prove diffi-
cult and costly because backup tapes are not organized in an easily
searchable format: the purpose of having the tapes is not to archive
documents for later retrieval, but rather to allow recovery in the case
of disaster.79 Having located the tapes containing potentially respon-
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's note (1970),
which states:
[T]he courts have ample power under Rule 26(c) to protect respondent against undue
burden or expense, either by restricting discovery or requiring that the discovering
party pay the costs. Similarly, if the discovering party needs to check the electronic
source itself, the court may protect the respondent with respect to preservation of his
records, confidentiality of non-discoverable matters and costs.
The normal presumption under the discovery rules is that the responding party must bear the
expense of compliance. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
76. See Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002) (the defendants seeking order to prevent discovery of e-mail correspon-
dence due to excessive burden and expense involved); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31
(D.D.C. 2001) (Department of Justice claiming that the cost to restore e-mails from backup
tapes was excessive); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(the defendant claiming that allowing discovery of "deleted" e-mails from her hard drive would
cause undue burden because it would require shutting down her business for a time); Murphy
Oil USA v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. CIV.A. 99-3564, 2002 WL246439 (E.D. La., Feb. 19, 2002)
(the defendant claiming that expense and burden of restoring ninety-three e-mail backup tapes
outweighed the likely benefits).
77. See, e.g., Playboy Enterprises, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1052 (appointing the court's own elec-
tronic discovery specialist to perform the task of creating a "mirror image" of the defendant's
hard drive).
78. See Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 426-27 (describing the multi-stage process).
79. See McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 33.
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sive data, the producing party must then restore these tapes, save them
to a master database, and remove any duplicate e-mails. If the
producing party wishes to redact portions of e-mails in order to
protect sensitive or privileged information, the party must also convert
the files into a Tagged Image File Format (TIFF file). Finally, the
producing party may wish to review all the files for privileged
information before they are handed over to the requesting party. Due
to the huge quantity of e-mails that may be produced in some cases,
this privilege review can significantly add to the cost of production.80
Faced with the expense of restoring and producing deleted e-
mails, many litigants request that the court either curtail the scope of a
request for deleted e-mails or shift the cost to the requesting party. In
theory, the difficulty and cost of producing "deleted" e-mails should
limit the overall amount produced. If the courts are already limiting
access to "deleted" e-mails or taking the privacy interests of the e-mail
authors into account when applying the proportionality principle, the
need for a modification of the discovery rules to protect privacy will be
reduced.81 It is therefore worthwhile to analyze how the courts have
applied Rule 26(c)'s proportionality test in the context of electronic
discovery in general and deleted e-mails in particular.82
a. Early Attempts to Shift the Cost of Producing E-mail
The courts got off to a bumpy start when attempting to apply the
proportionality principle to discovery of deleted e-mails. In one of the
first cases to address the issue, In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs
Antitrust Litigation,3 the U.S. District Court of Illinois denied a re-
quest to shift the cost of producing e-mails from backup tapes, be-
cause the court felt that the extra expense was a result of the producing
80. See Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 426-27 (one of the four defendant companies estimating that
it would cost approximately $247,000 to have a paralegal review responsive e-mails for privilege).
Alternatively, a defendant could choose to perform privilege review by conducting a computer
search of all responsive files. The danger with this review form is that it will not locate all privi-
leged documents. For example, some attorney-client correspondence may not include the term"confidential" or "privileged" and therefore avoid detection.
81. It should be noted that many discovery disputes are resolved informally. Before hear-
ing a discovery dispute, a court will require that the moving party at least attempt informal reso-
lution. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(2)(A), (B); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d).
Also, anecdotal evidence suggests that some litigants have applied their own limitations on e-
mail discovery by agreeing not to request each other's e-mails to avoid the huge costs involved.
Kate Marquess, In Re: Technology Discovery Grab Bag, 36 ARK. LAW. 38, 39 (2001).
82. For a more comprehensive analysis of cost-shifting in the realm of electronic discovery,
see Corinne L. Giacobbe, Note, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age: Deciding Who
Should Bear the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257
(2000).
83. C.A. No. 94C897, MDL No. 997, 1995 WL 360526 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995).
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party's choice of technology, and therefore held that the producing
party should bear these added costs. 4 In Brand Name Prescription, the
class plaintiffs had requested production of a large number of e-mails
from a defendant drug manufacturer. Estimating that it would cost
between $50,000 and $70,000 to search, compile, and format respon-
sive e-mails from backup tapes that contained roughly 30 million
separate messages, the drug company sought an order shifting the
costs to the plaintiffs. The court stated that a number of factors
should be considered in addition to the cost of production. These fac-
tors included the benefit to be gained by production of the e-mails and
the respective parties' ability to bear the cost of production and to re-
duce the costs of production. 5
Having listed these additional factors, the court then essentially
ignored them and focused on the drug manufacturer's decision to util-
ize a backup software system. The court stated that "if a party
chooses an electronic storage method, the necessity for a retrieval pro-
gram or method is an ordinary and foreseeable risk. '"6 The court's
reasoning has been criticized as displaying a fundamental ignorance of
the reality of computer use in modern business.8 7 The court seems to
punish the defendant drug company for "choosing" to use an elec-
tronic storage system, and in doing so appears ignorant of the fact that
by 1995 computers were such an invaluable tool that they were essen-
tially replacing paper files in most businesses.88 Furthermore, for
many businesses, there was no realistic alternative to electronic storage
because many documents existed only in electronic format and the
cost of printing hardcopies would be prohibitive. The court does not
appear to understand that the primary purpose of backup tapes is "to
permit recovery from disaster, not archival preservation. '"89 If it had
really understood this important point, the court would undoubtedly
have understood why it is unrealistic to require companies to maintain
backup tapes containing a "snapshot" of the entire computer system in
easily recoverable or searchable format.
84. Id. at *2.
85. Id. (citing Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459 (D. Utah 1985)).
86. Id.
87. See Pulver, supra note 11, at 1422 (criticizing the court for not recognizing that it is in-
evitable that businesses will use digital networks); see also Giacobbe, supra note 82, at 280-81
(stating that the court did not realize the extent to which computers have become a part of mod-
ern business).
88. See Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 462 (D. Utah 1985) ("Computers have
become so commonplace that most court battles now involve discovery of some computer-stored
information.").
89. McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 31 (D.D.C. 2001).
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The judicial confusion continued in Linnen v. A.H. Robbins Co.,90
where the court again refused to shift the cost of producing deleted e-
mails because the cost of producing e-mails from backup tapes was
part of the risk inherent in choosing to use computer technology. 91
The plaintiff in Linnen was faced with a request to restore deleted e-
mails from backup tapes at an estimated cost of up to $1.75 million.9"
The defendant had already produced a large number of active e-mails
recovered from the employees' hard drives. Refusing to grant the
plaintiff relief from the cost of production, the court repeated the
Brand Name court's analysis:
While [this] court certainly recognizes the significant cost asso-
ciated with restoring and producing responsive communications
from these tapes, it agrees ... that this is one of the risks taken
on by companies which have made the decision to avail them-
selves of the computer technology now available to the business
world. To permit a corporation such as [the defendant] to reap
the business benefits of such technology and simultaneously use
that technology as a shield in litigation would lead to incongru-
ous and unfair results.93
Like the Brand Name court, the Linnen court viewed use of com-
puter technology as a matter of choice rather than a business necessity.
The Linnen court's statement is even more surprising, however, be-
cause it was delivered in 1999, and by that time, even moderately
computer savvy members of the general public were aware that the ef-
ficiency advantages of computers had made their use in many busi-
nesses virtually mandatory. Additionally (as later courts eventually
recognized), requesting parties are likely to request as many backup e-
mails as possible if there is a presumption that a party using com-
puters should pay the costs of producing electronic data. Thus, the
legal rules initially seemed to encourage litigants to seek maximum
production of deleted e-mails.
b. The Emerging Test for Cost-Shifting
Perhaps in response to the widespread criticism of the Brand
Name court's view of computer usage, or perhaps simply because
judges have had more time to develop an understanding of computer
technology, recent cases addressing the issue of proportional produc-
tion of deleted e-mails have shown a more subtle analysis. In the first
90. No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 16, 1999).
91. Id. at 6.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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case to display this new attitude, McPeek v. Ashcroft,94 an ex-employee
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) sued the DOJ, claiming that he
was retaliated against for having accused his supervisor of sexual har-
assment.95 Although the DOJ had already searched its active e-mail
files for responsive messages, the plaintiff further requested that the
Department should be forced to search its backup computer tapes for
e-mails from the computer of the plaintiffs former supervisor and
others. In response, the DOJ claimed that the likelihood of locating
relevant evidence on the tapes could not justify the great expense of
restoration.
The U.S. District Court of District of Columbia first acknowl-
edged that the primary purpose of the backup system was not for
preservation for later business use, but rather as an insurance against
catastrophic failure of the computer systems.97 Then, in a direct re-
sponse to the Brand Name court's presumption that the cost of restora-
tion was simply a cost of doing business, the court noted that it was
almost impossible to walk into any business or government agency
without encountering a computer system.98 In light of this reality, the
court asked, "What alternative [to using a computer] is there? Quill
pens?"99
Preferring a conservative course of action, the court then ordered
the DOJ to perform a "test run" restoration of the plaintiffs ex-
supervisor's e-mails for a one-year period. The DOJ was also ordered
to certify the cost of this test run, and the parties were to be given the
opportunity to later argue that further discovery was justified."0 In
the wake of McPeek, it seemed that the courts might not automatically
assume that the producing party should bear the cost of restoring e-
mails simply because it chose to use computers to back up its files. Six
months later, in Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency,
Inc. ,o the U.S. District Court of New York affirmed this view.
The Rowe plaintiff was a black concert promoter, who had ac-
cused the defendant booking agencies and concert promoters of at-
tempting to freeze them out of the market for promoting concerts for
white bands.12 The plaintiff made thirty-five requests for documents
including any e-mail communications relating to the selection of con-
94. 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001).
95. Id. at 31-32.
96. Id. at 32.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 33.
100. Id. at 35.
101. 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
102. Id. at 423.
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cert promoters. °3 Four of the defendants objected to the requests and
sought a court order either limiting the production of e-mails or re-
quiring the plaintiff to bear the costs of production.0 4 The four de-
fendants produced estimates ranging from $84,000 to $403,000 for
compliance with the request, not including the cost of reviewing the e-
mail messages for privileged information."'
Analyzing whether the costs of production should be shifted to
the plaintiff, the district court first rejected the plaintiffs reliance on
the Brand Name presumption that production costs were cost of using
computers that should remain with the defendants. The court ob-
served that the basic premise of the plaintiffs argument was flawed
because it was based on the premise that e-mail messages are retained
because they are useful and if a party is willing to pay the cost of re-
tention, it should hence pay the cost of production.0 6 Electronic data,
however, was different; it could be retained simply because the cost of
doing so is minimal or for the limited purpose of recovery in the case
of disaster. The court thus soundly rejected the Brand Name court's
reasoning and concluded that "it is not enough to say that because a
party retained electronic information, it should necessarily bear the
cost of producing it.' 10 7
Having rejected the Brand Name presumption, the court turned
to a multi-factor analysis to determine whether the cost of producing
e-mails should be shifted to the plaintiff. The relevant factors in-
cluded (1) the specificity of the request, (2) the likelihood of finding
relevant information, (3) the availability of such information from
other sources, (4) the purposes for which the data was retained, (5) the
possibility that the responding party might benefit from the produc-
tion, (6) the total cost of production, (7) the relative ability of the par-
ties to control costs and the incentives to do so, and (8) the resources
of each party.' 8 The court then analyzed the facts of the case and
found that five of the factors favored a finding that the costs should be
shifted, two favored a finding to the contrary, and one factor (the par-
ties' resources) was neutral.0 9 Thus, the court ordered the plaintiff to
bear the cost of production."'
103. Id. at 424.
104. Id. at 424-26.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 429.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 429-32.
110. Id. at 433.
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One month later, the U.S. District Court of Louisiana adopted
the same multi-factor test to decide whether the costs of producing e-
mails from backup tapes and again held that the cost should be shifted
to the requesting party."' This new approach is likely to result in a
shift of the cost of producing electronic evidence more often than un-
der the Brand Name analysis. It is not completely clear, however, pre-
cisely what effect the new test will have on requests for deleted e-
mails.
It appears that many of the factors listed by the Rowe court will
usually favor shifting the cost of production where the requesting
party seeks access to deleted e-mails. For example, the fourth factor
listed in Rowe-the purposes for which the data is retained-will al-
most always favor cost shifting in such a situation because deleted e-
mails are generally located on backup tapes and hard drives. As the
McPeek, Rowe, and Fluor courts noted, backup tapes are not kept to
ensure that the information can be accessed for regular business pur-
poses, but to insure against a disaster that wipes out a company's elec-
tronically stored data. Likewise, deleted e-mail messages that remain
on hard drives because they have not been overwritten are not inten-
tionally kept for further use but remain solely due to a quirk in the
technology.
The sixth Rowe factor-the total cost of production-will favor
cost shifting when deleted e-mail messages are targeted because the
restoration process is complicated, expensive, and time consuming.
The Rowe court suggested that, based on precedent, costs as little as
$1,680 could be considered sufficiently substantial to warrant cost
shifting." 2 It is difficult to imagine that any request for production of
deleted e-mails from backup tapes or hard drives would cost less than
this amount, and in many of the reported cases, the costs can run into
tens of thousands or possibly even millions of dollars." 3 The seventh
factor-the parties' relative ability and incentive to control costs-will
tend to favor cost shifting in most cases because, as the Rowe court
stated, the requesting party controls how expansive discovery will be,
and therefore "[t]hey are in the best position to decide whether further
searches would be justified."" 4
On the other hand, at least one of the Rowe factors may favor the
producing party retaining the burden of paying for discovery of de-
111. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, No. Civ. A. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439 (E.D.
La. Feb. 19, 2002).
112. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 431.
113. See, e.g., Fluor, 2002 WL 246439, at *6 (noting that the cost of producing e-mails in
that case was $6,000,000).
114. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 432.
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leted e-mails. This is because deleted e-mails, by their nature, are
generally not available from other sources.
The picture emerging from these recent cases is that the courts
are increasingly likely to shift the cost of producing deleted e-mails to
a requesting party. However, it is worth noting that the number of e-
mails produced is nevertheless likely to remain steady so long as the
requesting party believes that the cost of production is worthwhile
given the possible rewards. In this regard, the fact that e-mails are
considered likely to contain "smoking gun" evidence will tend to en-
courage parties to request deleted e-mail documents even if they must
pay to do so. In fact, in each of the cases where the cost of production
was shifted to the requesting party, production of large quantities of e-
mails proceeded nonetheless.
c. Attempts to Assert Privacy Concerns
In their attempts to limit the scope of discovery of e-mails under
Rule 26(c), parties have claimed that the detrimental effect on their
privacy also constitutes a "burden" that should be considered.
Although no court has actually precluded the production of de-
leted e-mails on privacy grounds, at least one court was willing to take
privacy considerations into account when establishing the procedure
by which e-mails were to be recovered. In Playboy Enterprises Inc. v.
Welles," the publisher of Playboy sued a former "Playmate of the
Year," claiming that the use of its Playboy and Playmate trademarks
on her personal website infringed its trademarks. 1 6 During the dis-
covery phase of trial, the plaintiff became aware that the defendant
had deleted e-mail messages on the personal computer that she used
for both business and personal correspondence. Consequently, the
plaintiff requested that they should be allowed to access the defen-
dant's computer in order to restore any deleted e-mails that had not
already been overwritten." 7 In response, the defendant claimed that
the four-to-eight-hour shutdown needed to recover the deleted e-mails
would cause her to suffer financial losses, would result in production
of privileged attorney-client confidences, and would seriously infringe
her privacy." 8
The court held that the plaintiff should be allowed access to the
computer, but in order to protect the defendant's privacy and attor-
ney-client privilege, the court placed conditions upon the recovery
115. 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
116. Id. at 1051.
117. Id. at 1052.
118. Id. at 1054.
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process." 9 First, the plaintiff was required to produce statements from
experts to the effect that there was a likelihood that the e-mails could
be recovered, as well as the likelihood of damage to the defendant's
computer system. 120 Furthermore, once a copy of the hard drive was
made, it should be given to the defendant who could then withhold
any unresponsive e-mails.12' At first glance, this decision seems to in-
dicate that courts may be willing to take procedural steps to protect
the privacy interests of producing parties. However, the facts of the
Playboy case are somewhat unusual in that the producing party was
self-employed. In the more common setting where employers are
asked to produce the e-mail messages of its employees, the courts have
not been as sensitive to the privacy concerns of the individual authors.
For example, in the Rowe case, the defendant business attempted
to assert the privacy concerns of its employees in addition to its re-
quest to shift the costs of production. In Rowe, as is likely the case in
most businesses, the defendant's archived e-mail files contained the
employee's personal as well as business communications. The court,
however, refused to take into account the privacy concerns of the em-
ployees whose messages were to be produced because "an employee
who uses his or her employer's computer for personal communications
assumes some risk that they will be accessed by the employer or by
others." 22
Thus, it seems that any consideration of the e-mail author's pri-
vacy concerns, which may be allowed when the author himself is the
producing party, simply disappears when it is his employer that pro-
duces the messages. The court's reasoning demonstrates that the pri-
vacy concerns of e-mail authors in the context of discovery are only
one aspect of the overall picture. It will be of little comfort to employ-
ees that their deleted e-mails will not be produced during discovery if,
as is currently the case, their employer can monitor their messages
without notification.12 3
The Rowe court also suggested that the defendant in that case
could have cured any privacy concerns of its employees by simply re-
moving any personal correspondences before production. Again, this
is not likely to provide any realistic protection for employees. It is
unlikely that a business will go to the added expense of reviewing all e-
mails and excluding any personal messages. Even if an employer took
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 428.
123. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury, 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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these steps, the process of reading and removing employee's e-mails is
likely to be an intrusion in and of itself.
The preceding discussion of the application of the existing limits
on discovery suggests that deleted e-mails will continue to be pro-
duced in large quantities and that employee's privacy concerns will not
be taken into account. Before discussing whether privacy and other
concerns should be considered in this context, it will be useful to con-
sider the impact, if any, that the rules have had on e-mail usage.
V. HOW THE PRESENT DISCOVERY RULES AFFECT E-MAIL USAGE
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the present discovery rules are
changing the way we use e-mail. Commentators have increasingly
recommended extreme caution to companies in the use of e-mail, often
citing broad discovery of e-mails and the inability to control the de-
struction of e-mails as key factors.124 Companies are being advised to
set up e-mail retention policies that retain only the absolute minimum
amount of electronic evidence for the absolute minimum time.125
Many commentators recommend companies not to allow e-mail to be
used for personal purposes, others place restrictions on the type of
communications that e-mail may be used for, and some warn that "if
you wouldn't want the message published in a newspaper, don't write
it in an e-mail" 126 or encourage employers to "tell employees that if
they are in doubt about whether to send an e-mail, they should ask
themselves: 'How would I feel if this ended up in the hands of my
worst enemy?' ' 127 Businesses are encouraged to inform employees not
to use humor or sarcasm 2 ' and to adopt document "retention" policies
124. See Carey S. Meyer & Kari L. Wraspir, E-Discovery: Preparing Clients For (and Pro-
tecting Them Against) Discovery in the Electronic Age, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 939 (2000);
Henry S. Knight, Jr. et al., Technology Issues in the Workplace, 47 FEDERAL LAWYER, Oct. 2000,
at 34; Grover J. Brittain, Drafting an E-Mail and Internet Usage Policy for Your Firm, 27
COLORADO LAWYER, Oct. 1998, at 17.
125. See Ballon supra note 49 ("[Blackup tapes should regularly be overwritten so that at
any given moment a company only has records of e-mail for the preceding week or two."); Meyer
& Wraspir, supra note 124, at 959 ("[A]s part of their routine practice, companies should con-
sider using computer programs that electronically remove deleted messages so that hey can no
longer be retrieved.").
126. Meyer & Wraspir, supra note 124, at 957.
127. Brittain, supra note 124.
128. Knight, Jr. et al., supra note 124 ("[N]o employee should create an e-mail referring to
age in a joking, sarcastic, or pejorative manner."); Sheila J. Carpenter & Shaunda A. Patterson,
Discovery of Electronic Documents, in BRIEF, 29 A.B.A. TORT & INSURANCE PRACTICE
SECTION 1, 64, 69 (2000) (recommending that employers should discourage employees from
using humor and sarcasm in e-mail messages).
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that employ special software to permanently delete e-mails as soon as
they are read.129
At least on a corporate level, it seems likely that e-mail use will
become increasingly limited to strictly innocuous information. Even
where no official policy is in place, individuals who are aware of the
indestructibility of e-mail communications are likely to resort to more
traditional modes of communication, leaving e-mail to operate in a
diminished capacity of transporting strictly sterile business informa-
tion.
VI. PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVACY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF
LIMITED PRODUCTION OF "DELETED" E-MAIL
In the realm of discovery practice, the Advisory Committee
brought the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure into the modern com-
puter age in 1970 by simply adding the words "data compilations" to
the list of document types that could be produced. Because the first e-
mail was not sent until one year after the committee made this change,
the committee could not have contemplated the ramifications this ad-
dition would have for a society, which thirty years later, produces 500
billion e-mail messages annually.13 These facts alone suggest, at the
very least, that re-evaluation of the Rules is warranted. Indeed, the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference has
noted that "electronic storage and retrieval of information are chang-
ing the opportunities for discovery and the dangers of excessive dis-
covery."''
The purpose of this Comment is to question whether the diffi-
culty that e-mail users face in deleting their e-mail messages might
also lead to excessive discovery. The question, therefore, is whether
the benefits gained by complete disclosure of "deleted" e-mails justify
the burdens placed on recognized societal interests. Discovery should
be curtailed if the revelation of a category of information will result in
a net detriment to recognized public concerns such as efficiency, pri-
129. Charles A. Lovell & Roger W. Holmes, The Dangers of E-Mail: The Need for Elec-
tronic Data Retention Policies, 44 R.I. B.J. 7, 9 (1995) ("In most cases, e-mail should be destroyed
immediately after the recipient reads the message.").
130. Peter Lyman & Hal R. Varian, How Much Information?, available at http://www.
sims.berkeley.edu/how-much-info/internet/emaildetails.html (showing a study produced by the
faculty and students at the School of Information Management and Systems, University of Cali-
fornia (Berkeley)) (original release Oct. 18, 2000) (last visited May 25, 2002).
131. Alfred W. Cortese Jr. & Edward C. Wolfe, Electronic Discovery: Problems and Solu-
tions, in METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Apr. 2000 (citing a Memorandum from Hon.
Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Chief Justice, Re: Comment
on Letters on Disclosure and Discovery Proposals, Sept. 1, 1999, at 3).
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vacy, and free speech. 3 2 This is in line with commonly accepted ra-
tionales for the traditional privileges such as attorney-client privilege
and work product, which reflect the recognized societal concern of al-
lowing access to certain materials in the judicial system. What follows
are discussions of some of the public policy concerns that are interre-
lated in many ways and that up until now have not received serious
consideration in the context of the discovery of deleted e-mails.
A. Efficiency Costs
Under the present discovery rules, an e-mail user cannot easily
prevent a discarded e-mail message from being produced in discovery
and subsequently used at trial. On a corporate level, the threat of
large-scale mining of the stored e-mail files has become a significant
source of concern for commercial entities, particularly for those that
rely heavily on e-mail for both internal and external communications
and are regularly involved in litigation.133 For both individuals and
corporations, e-mail offers efficiency advantages unavailable in any
other widely used form of communication. However, the ability to
avail one's self of e-mail's unique efficiencies is likely to be restricted
to the extent that e-mail has the potential to become a source of legal
liability in future lawsuits.'34 A presumption that deleted e-mails are
undiscoverable would greatly relieve, although not eliminate, some of
the concerns faced by individuals and companies alike.
In the business setting, individuals are being discouraged from
using e-mail and encouraged to use traditional forms of private com-
munications, like the telephone, for correspondence that might subject
the business to future legal liability. For example, it is likely that e-
mail usage among the top-level management of many of the country's
largest companies has changed considerably following the dramatic
fashion in which Bill Gates of Microsoft was forced to defend poten-
tially harmful e-mail messages that were sent internally. This is not to
say that these corporate managers are not entertaining many of the
same thoughts as before-undoubtedly, antitrust, sexual harassment,
or discrimination issues will continue to exist-although it is likely
132. A similar analysis is used in those cases that have suggested that there should be a
self-analysis privilege. See Flynn v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 91CIV. 0035 KMW, 1993 WL
362380, at *1 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 16 1993).
133. See Scott Dean, E-Mail Forces Companies to Grapple With Privacy Issues, CORP.
LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 1993, at 11; Marianne Lavelle, Digital Information Boom Worries Corporate
Counsel, NAT'L L.J., May 30, 1994, at B.
134. See Goldstein, supra note 45, at 1 ("Like ghosts from the past, these forgotten elec-
tronic blips can come back to haunt a litigant, since computer data bases are subject to civil dis-
covery requests.").
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that the actors will seek out a more secure forum.'35 Arguably, less ef-
ficient means of communication might only be used in a relatively
small number of cases where the parties think that their statements,
ideas, or thoughts are likely to have negative legal consequences.
However, given the variety of possible legal liability in modern busi-
nesses, the increase in the use of less efficient means of communication
may nevertheless result in significant inefficiency.
In addition to the increased use of inefficient communication
methods, there will likely be a decrease in the amount of information
available during discovery as a result of two factors. First, as users be-
come better educated regarding the possible use of e-mail against them
in litigation, they will tend not to produce the "smoking gun" e-mails
that have caused such alarm in some of the recent high profile cases.
Furthermore, sophisticated e-mail users will become more likely to
employ encryption software in an attempt to prevent access to their
correspondence in future litigation. The process of diminishing re-
turns of evidentiary quality e-mails may take time but is likely to oc-
cur.
Efficiency concerns involve questions of cost and time; a more
serious issue is raised when an author thinks they have deleted an e-
mail message yet later learns that the message may still be used as evi-
dence in future litigation. It is the equivalent of a person shredding a
letter and throwing it in the garbage, only to find it is legally permissi-
ble for another person to dig around in his garbage, take out the
shredded message, and use it as evidence against him.
B. Privacy Concerns
Privacy concerns are implicated when the contents of millions of
individual communications may legally be exposed to an audience
wider than that expected or desired by the author. It must be noted at
the outset that the following discussion will refer to general concepts
of privacy rather than privacy rights. Although the two concepts are
related, the general concept of privacy involves a broad spectrum of
issues on how much we should protect individuals from intrusion by
outside forces, whatever form the intrusion may take. Privacy rights,
on the other hand, generally refer to a narrower set of constitutional
restraints on strictly governmental intrusions, such as search and sei-
135. At least one district judge concluded that people's thoughts, if not their expression of
those thoughts, will not be changed regardless of whether they refrain from communicating
them. See Rosenbaum supra note 47, at 395 ("[D]oes anyone believe that people are 'thinking'
more perfect thoughts simply because they are increasingly reluctant to express them? I seri-
ously doubt it.").
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zure restrictions, under the Fourth Amendment. 36 These constitu-
tional restraints are relevant in this Comment insofar as they demon-
strate that privacy, at least in some form, has always been seen as a
right of all people. The alternative, of course, would be an Orwellian
nightmare, where the state could freely intrude on the individual.
However, this Comment addresses more limited question as to
whether privacy concerns are implicated when deleted e-mails can be
freely accessed during discovery, and if so, whether the intrusion is
nevertheless justifiable by the ultimate truth finding goal in litigation.
Before attempting to assess the degree to which individual privacy
concerns are implicated, it is necessary to at least attempt to define
privacy. The challenge of doing so, however, has proven difficult and
has occupied some of the keenest legal minds of the past two centu-
ries. 137
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis described privacy
as "the right to be let alone,"' 38 thus beginning an ongoing discussion
regarding the core principles implicated by the concept of privacy.
Later in his career, Justice Brandeis stated that privacy was "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men."'39 Although the Justice's comment illustrates the importance
that some noted jurists have placed on privacy, it does not help narrow
the definition of privacy to concrete terms.
Nearly three-quarters of a century after the Warren and Brandeis
article, Edward Bloustein attempted to provide a more unifying and
useful description of the privacy interest.140  He concluded that the
core interest that privacy sought to protect was human dignity. Pre-
sciently, Bloustein also realized that technological advances posed a
significant threat:
[I]n our own day scientific and technological advances have
raised the spectre of new and frightening invasions of privacy.
Our capacity as a society to deal with the impact of this new
technology depends, in part, on the degree to which we can as-
similate the threat it poses to the settled ways of our legal insti-
136. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizures."). The Supreme Court has
implied other privacy rights. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recogniz-
ing a right to marital privacy).
137. See J.B. YOUNG, PRIVACY 2 (J.B. Young ed., 1978) ("[P]rivacy, like an elephant, is
more easily recognized than described.").
138. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195
(1890).
139. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
140. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964).
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tutions have developed for dealing with similar threats in the
past. 141
Bloustein was concerned with the "spectre" of electronic surveil-
lance. 42  However, his concerns apply equally to the more benign
technology of e-mail. The "spectre" at issue in this context is the in-
ability of persons to easily delete e-mail messages, or, put another way,
technology's ability to limit ease of deletion.
Although the concepts of human dignity and personality may be
useful in defining the broad sweep of the privacy concept, these con-
cepts are extremely difficult to apply to real world situations. The
concept of privacy as described by Professor Alan Westin, however, is
easier to apply. Professor Westin agreed that privacy had the ability
to protect human dignity 143 but went a step further and isolated four
social goals that are furthered by protecting a citizen's right to control
the release of personal information. 144
First, Professor Westin stated that privacy has a role in the pro-
tection of personal autonomy and individuality. It affords an individ-
ual a zone of protection, where new ideas can be tested before being
revealed to a wider audience. 4 ' Second, privacy provides a means for
individuals to relax without having to worry about the pressure of
playing societal roles. Thus, the individual is allowed to essentially
"blow off steam" without worrying about being held responsible for
his comments.'46 Third, privacy allows an individual to evaluate the
increasing amount of information that surrounds him before choosing
to make his reasoned thoughts public.'47 Finally, Professor Westin
suggests that privacy also provides a means by which an individual
can safely share his most personal feelings and secrets with those he
trusts. 148 This concept is related to the community building function
141. Id. at 963.
142. Id. at 963 n.7.
143. See ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 33 (1967) ("In democratic societies
there is a fundamental belief in the uniqueness of the individual, in his basic dignity and worth as
a creature of God and a human being, and in the need to maintain social processes that safeguard
his sacred individuality.").
144. Professor Westin's definition has also been used in the debate over the appropriate
degree of privacy to be given to personal information. See Walker, supTa note 13, 1 6 ("For pur-
poses of framing the contemporary debate about whether and how to regulate the exchange of
personal information, the best definition of privacy arguably comes from the seminal modern
work Privacy and Freedom by Alan Westin....").
145. Id. at 34.
146. Id. at 35.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 39.
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that e-mail may perform in a modern urban society where "reserved
communication is the means for psychic self-preservation. P,149
To understand the role of e-mail in furthering the privacy goals
outlined by Professor Westin, an analysis of how e-mail is used is in
order. Empirical evidence suggests that many e-mail users expose
their most candid thoughts in e-mails, which is one of the primary rea-
sons why e-mails currently play such a prominent role in discovery.
In the pre-computer world, these interactions would have been carried
out via telephone or in person-in doorways or around the water
cooler. These candid e-mail messages represent thoughts that an indi-
vidual would usually commit to a more permanent written record only
when they felt that the ideas were fully developed and refined.'
Whether justified in doing so, a great many people seem to use e-mail
as though it provides a secure zone in which they can further the goals
outlined by Professor Westin. This situation alone indicates that the
outlets for these types of personal interactions may severely be limited
by the potential discoverability of these private messages.
A recent decision by the U.S. District Court of Maryland illus-
trates the limited availability of communication tools to serve indi-
vidualistic and expressive goals of privacy.15' Mr. Allan Lucas, a
management-level employee at the United States Fidelity and Guar-
anty Company, sent an e-mail message to his fellow management-level
employee that contained a numerical code corresponding to a list of
seventy-five profane words and phrases." 2 Mr. Lucas then utilized
the code to criticize his general manager, inserting the numerical
equivalent for each profane word." 3 In a later e-mail, Mr. Lucas ex-
pressed his dissatisfaction with new salary provisions at the firm and
again utilized the code to insert a number of profane phrases.5 4 As a
result of these e-mails, Mr. Lucas was fired.' What is particularly
notable about this case is the apparent lack of outlets for secure com-
munication available to Mr. Lucas. As a management-level employee,
he likely had a range of possible ways to communicate at his disposal.
Yet, apparently, none allowed him the ability to vent his personal
views on issues that affected his work.
149. Id.
150. See Susan J. Silvernail, Electronic Discovery in the Computer Age, 58 ALA. LAWYER
176, May, 1997, at 181 (noting that e-mail has become a substitute for telephonic and printed
communications, as well as a substitute for direct oral communications).
151. See Miller v. U.S.F. & G., No. 93-1968, 1994 WL 395718 (D. Md. May 13, 1994).
152. Id. at*2.
153. Id. When translated from the code, Mr. Lucas's message described his manager as a
"Dick Head." Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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Mr. Lucas attempted, in vain, to establish his own zone of pri-
vacy on an e-mail network. He did so precisely for the reasons that
Professor Westin outlined. He was attempting to release his feelings
to a trusted colleague, to "blow off steam" about various subjects such
as his manager and his firm's policies. Undoubtedly, he was not ready
to tell his manager how he felt about him, although, over time, he may
have refined his thoughts enough to confront the manager regarding
his concerns. However, Mr. Lucas did not get that chance, as his
thoughts were revealed uncensored and unrefined, and not surpris-
ingly, the consequences were serious.
In addition to providing individuals with a channel for releasing
their emotions, e-mail also serves to convey the more relaxed commu-
nications that are a part of everyday life. Jeffrey Rosen, the author of a
recent book addressing privacy concerns in the modern age, asserts
that "[f]or more and more citizens the most important way of
exchanging gossip is e-mail."1"6 Although gossip is not the foundation
on which civilizations are built, gossip and other related modes of ex-
pression such as humor, sarcasm, irony, and satire have been around
for centuries and enrich the human experience. It is probably easiest
to understand the degree to which they do so by imagining a society
wherein these forms of expression are not allowed, a society more to-
talitarian than democratic.
C. Free Speech
Privacy also tends to encourage free expression. The goals ad-
vanced by affording privacy to the individual are similar to the goals
achieved by protecting free speech."5 7 Freedom of expression is central
to a democratic society. As the privacy expectations of e-mail users
diminish, the freedom of the thoughts expressed via this medium will
likely tend to move towards only those ideas and thoughts considered
acceptable for a wide audience."' 8 There is a risk that organizational
and individual censorship will result and much will be lost.
Of the billions of e-mail messages that are sent each year, there
are undoubtedly a large number of messages that would not be consid-
156. Jeffrey Rosen, The Eroded Self, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 30, 2000, §6, at 51.
157. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970).
Emerson lists four essential values of free speech. First, it allows for individual self-fulfillment.
Second, it allows for the advancement of knowledge and discovery of truth. Third, it allows par-
ticipation in the decision making process by all members of society. Finally, it encourages a
"more adaptable and hence stable community." Id. at 389.
158. Heather Brewer, Snap Judgments, BUSINESS LAW TODAY, July-Aug. 1999, at 4
("The chill in cyberspace comes from the not-so-user-friendly impact that e-mail messages have
had in Microsoft's run-in with the Justice Department.").
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ered worthy of protection. However, the basic tenet of American free
speech jurisprudence holds that all ideas and expressions should be
encouraged as far as possible, until conflicting social concerns demand
that speech be limited."l 9 Where, as here, the effective curtailment oc-
curs of an individual's ability to control when and how to reveal his
speech, there is a danger that an author of ideas, both good and bad,
will turn to other less efficient means or refrain from expressing ideas
completely. Thus, the author, without ability to control his speech,
will express opinions via e-mail that "tend never to be different; his
aspirations, being known, tend always to be conventionally accepted
ones; his feelings, being openly exhibited tend to lose their quality of
unique personal warmth and to become the feelings of everyman.
Such a being, although sentient, is fungible; he is not and individ-
ual."' 6 ° Therefore, the cost to free speech must be considered in as-
sessing the relevant costs and benefits of exposing "deleted" e-mails to
the glare of judicial discovery.
VII. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
In light of the harmful effects on communication efficiency, pri-
vacy, and free speech that are likely to result from the present rules of
free discovery of "deleted" e-mails, it will be worthwhile to at least
consider alternative courses of action. If the "flaw" that needs to be
addressed is the inability of an author to effectively destroy e-mails in
the same manner as paper documents, the most obvious solution is to
allow technology to provide a remedy. Indeed, software programs are
now available to allow the sender of e-mails to destroy their messages
upon receipt or upon the passage of a certain time period after re-
1 161ceipt.
The technological self-help solution has the obvious advantage of
not requiring any judicial intervention. 162 Developing technology
would be allowed to provide the necessary privacy for individuals and
companies. There are, however, problems with relying on technology
alone. First, requiring individuals to create their own "privacy-zones"
is likely to lead to unequal protection. Whereas large firms may have
159. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 19; see also Abrams v. United States 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (evoking the image of a "market place of ideas").
160. Bloustein, supra note 140, at 1123.
161. For detailed information regarding one such program, see OMNIVA POLICY SYSTEMS,
TRANSPARENT AND EASY-TO-USE SECURE EMAIL, available at http://www.disappearinginc.
con (last visited June 1, 2002).
162. See William J. McSherry, Jr., "E-Discovery" and the Non-Party: Effective Use of Exist-
ing Protections Can Guard Against Unwarranted Expenses, N.Y. L.J., June 26, 2000, at S3 ("One
of the reasons for exercising great caution is that software and hardware continue to evolve at a
pace that far outstrips the capacity of the rule-making process to generate court rules.").
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the technical knowledge and deep pockets to pay for the cost of special
encryption software, individuals and smaller firms may not have simi-
lar resources. Second, even if encryption software becomes widely
available, we should question whether the legal rules should encourage
the use of "deletion" software. Software products that permanently
delete e-mail correspondence will greatly diminish the amount of evi-
dence available in all cases. It is the equivalent of encouraging com-
panies to shred all but the most vital documents. The pool of infor-
mation to be discovered in each case may be limited to those
documents created in the few days before the litigation became fore-
seeable. The likely result is to greatly hinder the central function of
discovery: the search for the truth.
Third, it may not be desirable to force litigants to enter into an
ever-escalating battle of encryption and decryption. It is not alto-
gether impossible that another software program may rise to the chal-
lenge of recovering even "permanently" destroyed e-mail messages,
although at even greater cost. Finally, given the choice, most observ-
ers would agree that it is better to avoid a situation where e-mail users
are forced to encrypt their messages if another alternative is available
because the very act of encryption can reinforce the feeling that the
"spectre" of surveillance is omnipresent in modern society.
Given the difficulties with allowing technology to solve the prob-
lem of undeletable e-mails, it may be desirable to consider an alterna-
tive solution: a presumption of non-discoverability of "deleted" e-
mails. In the normal case, a party's deleted e-mails would be off-
limits during discovery. However, a party could overcome this pre-
sumption by showing a strong likelihood that the deleted e-mails con-
tain relevant information. For example, a party could make this show-
ing by demonstrating that another party had deliberately set about
destroying relevant documents or by giving a detailed explanation as
to why the party believes relevant e-mails were deleted and the poten-
tial importance of this evidence to the issues being litigated. The ad-
vantage of such a rule is that the law would comport with the expecta-
tions of the majority of e-mail users-"delete" would once again mean
delete.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The present discovery rules, promulgated before the recent ex-
plosion of e-mail use, do not sufficiently reflect a number of important
societal concerns. E-mail, as the most dynamic communication device
of the present era, should be utilized to the maximum degree possible.
The cost to the truth finding function of discovery must be balanced
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against concerns about communication efficiency, privacy, and free
speech. We should not blindly force companies to use inefficient
communication tools or resort to encryption. Perhaps, more impor-
tantly, e-mail users should be afforded the luxury of a dress rehearsal
before being threatened with making their discarded thoughts public.
With regard to the present discovery practice, distinct advan-
tages are gained by enforcing a presumption against the discoverability
of "deleted" e-mails. Because the present trend of e-mail use will tend
to lessen the amount of available material for discovery over time, the
cost of this presumption to the judicial process will not be profound.
The Standing Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure should con-
sider an amendment to the civil rules.163 Time is of the essence be-
cause once usage habits are formed, they may be extremely difficult to
alter.
163. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure have adopted a provision that limits access to
residual or deleted data. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 196:
The responding party must produce the electronic or magnetic data that is responsive
to the request and is reasonably available to the responding party in its ordinary
course of business. If the responding party cannot - through reasonable efforts - re-
trieve the data or information requested or produce it in the form requested, the re-
sponding party must state an objection complying with these rules. If the court orders
the responding party to comply with the request, the court must also order that the
requesting party pay the reasonable expenses of any extraordinary steps required to
retrieve and produce the information.
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